Lithuanian law enforcers have commenced criminal proceedings over forgeries made in Latvia in a multimillion-dollar Lithuanian gas network connection with Europe.
There were searches performed in Latvia last week.
Almost a year ago Lithuanian media “15min” found in cooperation with Neka personiga that parts made in Russia were supplied for the construction of the 500 km long Lithuanian-Polish pipeline. The factory that manufactured those parts also supplied the Russian military industry.
It is worth mentioning that Latvian gas infrastructure management company Conexus Baltic Grid invested EUR 14.7 million into this massive project.
“15min” Research Department head Jurate Damulite reported that Lithuanian state company Amber Grid, which was responsible for managing GIPL, found markings of Russian Eterno factory’s markings under the paint of the supplied pipeline parts. Eterno is part of Chelyabinsk ChelPipe Group. Prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, this factory manufactured the majority of pipeline parts for the construction of pipelines in Baltic States, because they were cheaper than those made in Europe.
Prior to the start of GIPL pipeline construction there was a scandal in Lithuania when it became known that parts for this pipeline were ordered from Chelyabinsk.
Lithuanian Amber Grid decided to use only European parts for this project. Instead of Russian parts, the company ordered the same parts from Polish Tasta and Romanian Sara factories.
But the parts listed in documents as Polish and Romanian differed from what was supplied in the end. Certificates contained less information than necessary. The raw materials differed from those used in the Polish factory. The suspicious fittings were not sourced directly from the factory – they were supplied by Latvian “Conti Chemical Company”.
The same parts from Chelyabinsk that were supposed to be replaced were still used in GIPL pipeline. Certificates for those parts were forged through Latvian Conti Chemical and Polish Tasta.
Last week, the Lithuanian Financial Crimes Investigation Service performed searches in many locations around Lithuania. Latvian State Police did the same in Latvia after their Lithuanian colleagues requested it. The locations authorities had visited were not disclosed.
When asked if there was a search in their office last week, Conti Chemical Company did not answer.
General contractor Alvora was sued because of the scandal in Lithuania.
Because of the scandal, 157 sections of the strategically important pipeline do not have valid quality and security certificates.
Amber Grid believes Alvora has installed non-certified components in the pipeline. Now they have to be replaced.
The Chelyabinsk group of factories is owned by TMK. Dmitry Pumpyanksy was the owner of TMK until spring 2023. This man was in the first group of oligarchs believed to be close associates with Russian dictator Putin that received European sanctions after the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The Chelyabinsk factories changed owners, but they still remain under sanctions, the programme reports.
Conti Chemical Company registered in Riga is one of the main gas pipe suppliers in Latvia. Conexus Baltic Grid is among its clients. The company is owned by three people – Samuils Antokols (55%), Arkadijs Kogans (30%) and Viktors Brods (15%). The company was founded in 1994 as a subsidiary of Swiss “ABC Conti”. The scandalous Grigorijs Lucanskis was then a member of the management of the Swiss company.
Conexus board chairman Uldis Bariss said that before the war, supplies from the factory in question were a standard practice. He stressed that after the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine Conexus no longer ordered pipes or fittings from the factory in question. He also said he was certain the goods supplied from other countries to Latvia were authentic, because the specialists that worked with them had to be able to recognise them.
Fittings, pressure equipment and other parts used in main gas pipelines are required to be registered in the Latvian Register of Dangerous Appliances. This is done by independent inspection bodies, mostly private companies. When the pipeline is put into operation, the overall safety of the structure is assessed, and not the origin and documents of each part.
Conexus explains that suppliers are required to provide two certificates – one from the manufacturer and one from an independent inspection institution. Conti Chemical Company is a regular supplier of gas pipes and equipment.
The parties involved in the Lithuanian project believed Chelyabinsk factory representative Andrejs Vainsteins was involved in the scheme. He wrote on LinkedIn that he was once the apprentice to Latvian MEP Tatyana Zhdanok. In this role he had supposedly helped organise a conference concerning European-Russian cooperation in the field of energy. (BNN)
